

**THE STATES OF DELIBERATION**  
**of the**  
**ISLAND OF GUERNSEY**

**STATES' TRADING SUPERVISORY BOARD**

**REPAIRS TO GUERNSEY AIRPORT TERMINAL BUILDING ROOF**

The States are asked to decide: -

Whether, after consideration of the Policy Letter entitled 'Repairs To Guernsey Airport Terminal Building Roof', dated 5<sup>th</sup> October 2026, they are of the opinion:-

1. To agree to prioritise the Guernsey Airport Terminal Building Roof project into the Delivery stage of the Major Projects Portfolio.
2. To authorise the Policy & Resources Committee, following its consideration and approval of the Full Business Case, to open a capital vote for the completion of repair works to the Guernsey Airport Terminal Building Roof up to a maximum of £6.1 million, and to approve the release of such funding up to that amount from the General Revenue Reserve.
3. To authorise the Policy & Resources Committee to approve and release funding up to a maximum of £130,500 for the Guernsey Airport Terminal Building Roof project to reach Full Business Case stage.

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The Presiding Officer  
States of Guernsey  
Royal Court House  
St Peter Port

5<sup>th</sup> October 2026

Dear Madam

**1 Executive Summary**

- 1.1 Guernsey Airport is a key economic enabler, and the gateway to and from the island for around 700,000 passengers journeys every year. It is vital for the local tourism sector and the wider business community, as well as for islanders' medical requirements, and provides links to destinations across the UK and to Europe, for leisure, family, sporting and social activities.
- 1.2 The terminal building was opened in 2004. On a number of occasions – most recently during Storm Ciaran in 2023 – panels from the roof have been detached by high winds and fallen on to the airside apron or forecourt area. To mitigate the safety and operational risks, scaffolding was erected to prevent any further panels falling to the ground.
- 1.3 While the scaffolding performs an essential role, it is unsightly and provides an unwelcome first and last impression for visitors to the island. The States' Trading Supervisory Board (STSB) believes it imperative that it is removed at the earliest opportunity, but only when safe to do so.
- 1.4 The problem is caused by the roof's design and defects in its construction. If these are not resolved, further deterioration is inevitable and would necessitate the retention of scaffolding long-term.
- 1.5 The proposed repairs will address the accelerated deterioration of the roof's structural steelwork and associated components, to restore its wind resistance, prevent future failure, reduce reliance on reactive maintenance, and enable the removal of the scaffolding.

- 1.6 It is estimated these works will cost up to £6.1 million, including allowances for risk, technical adviser fees, and project management. While the STSB acknowledges this is costly, the repairs are both urgent and necessary. Simply leaving the scaffolding in place for protection is not viable, given the unsightly appearance it gives to a building of such gateway status. The STSB therefore recommends the project is moved from the Pipeline to Delivery category in the Major Projects Portfolio, and funded from the General Revenue Reserve. It is also recommended that release of funding is delegated to the Policy & Resources Committee (P&RC), subject to a Full Business Case.
- 1.7 Assuming the Assembly gives approval to proceed during 2026, works would be expected to commence in mid 2027, and could be completed by the end of 2028.

## **2 Introduction**

- 2.1 The terminal building roof structure is relatively complex, due to its curved design. There are two sections – one above each of the terminal’s two storeys. Each section comprises a steel frame, enclosed by roof panels above, “bullnose eaves” forming the outer edges, and soffit cladding along the underside. The panels are powder-coated aluminium, attached to a galvanised steel subframe fixed directly to the primary beams.
- 2.2 Construction of the terminal building, completed in 2004, encountered a number of issues. These included the insolvency of a primary sub-contractor, programme delays, and a significant budget overrun. The States subsequently pursued unsuccessful compensation claims against two firms contracted to provide quantity surveying and civil, mechanical and electrical engineering services.
- 2.3 As early as 2006, roof panels were observed to become loose in high winds. In 2008, a number of soffit panels became detached and were blown on to the airside apron area. Further, similar instances have occurred since, most recently during Storm Ciaran in 2023, when a number of panels were dislodged.
- 2.4 An engineering inspection following one such incident, in 2016, identified issues with the soffit and eaves installation as the cause. It found the panels in question did not fit correctly, had not been properly secured, and the secondary steelwork in the affected section was not sufficient to support the aluminium covering, given the terminal’s exposure to high winds. It concluded the installation had not adhered to the original design and detailed drawings, and *“the level of site adjustment and structural compromise would have undermined the [roof’s] fundamental design principles”*.
- 2.5 As well as repeated failures, these defects have resulted in widespread water ingress into roof voids and progressive corrosion of the structural steelwork.

- 2.6 Due to the health & safety and operational concerns, since 2025 the roof has been secured by scaffolding around the terminal building. This has also provided an access platform for a full, detailed structural inspection by civil engineers T&G.
- 2.7 That has confirmed that rather than suffering isolated or localised failures, the condition of the roof is the result of systemic defects in its design and construction. It concluded further deterioration is inevitable if these are not resolved, requiring long-term or even permanent scaffolding to ensure safety.
- 2.8 In terms of the cause of these defects, the report's findings were consistent with the 2016 survey:-

*"The overall shape and design of the building have resulted in a complex structure supporting an awkwardly shaped roof system. It is therefore not surprising to see that, whilst the construction follows the general arrangement drawings, many details appear to have been improvised or adjusted to suit on site. This may be through a lack of detailed information from the design team, or simply through issues discovered during construction. [We] are of the opinion that the works were executed with poor (or perhaps no) oversight."*

- 2.9 Total costs incurred for the scaffolding to the end of Q2 2026 is around £165,000.

#### **Strategic Context**

- 2.10 In April 2026, the States of Guernsey approved the Major Projects Portfolio<sup>1</sup>, which included the Guernsey Airport Terminal Building Roof as an essential infrastructure project within the pipeline category.
- 2.11 The States' Trading Supervisory Board is responsible for the efficient management and operation of Guernsey Ports. Guernsey Ports is operationally responsible for maintaining the airport infrastructure, facilities and equipment required to support the Bailiwick's air connectivity. This is essential for the local tourism sector and wider business community, and for islander's medical requirements, as well as providing links to destinations across the UK and Europe for leisure, family, sporting and social activities.
- 2.12 The airport terminal is the first building many visitors encounter. The scaffolding is considered unsightly and does not reflect well on the island as a whole.

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<sup>1</sup> [Major Projects Portfolio, Billet d'État VI of 2026.](#)

### **3 Proposed repairs**

- 3.1 T&G identified the repairs required to fully address the condition of each of the roof's structural components. These have been categorised in terms of priority (i.e. urgent, important, recommended), and cost (i.e. high, medium, low).
- 3.2 Preliminary cost estimates have been developed for three different scenarios. They range from £4.2 million to carry out only those repairs classed as urgent, to £6.1 million for all the works identified in each category. The interim option - only urgent and important repairs - is estimated would cost £4.5 million.
- 3.3 These estimates include a preliminary assessment of the baseline repair costs, allowances for risks and optimism bias, technical adviser fees, and project management costs.
- 3.4 In ranking the different elements according to priority and cost, T&G noted:-  
  
*“While the client has requested this breakdown, it is not practical to approach the works as individual elements; rather the most expedient manner of addressing the defects would be to remove soffit sheets to expose a section and address the various issues found in each one.”*
- 3.5 The roof covering has an anticipated remaining design life of 20 years. If all the current structural defects are addressed, further significant work is not expected to be required in that time, allowing permanent removal of the scaffolding.
- 3.6 If only urgent and/or important repairs are carried out, it is anticipated further remediation work will be required within five years. That will incur additional expenditure, not included in the current estimates but of similar magnitude. These scenarios would therefore only be a short-term solution that necessitates more scaffolding in future. The STSB does not consider these to be best value.
- 3.7 The full repair option involves extensive repairs to the structural steel beams, the secondary steel support frame, and the eaves and soffits. This will address the accelerated deterioration of the roof, restore its wind resistance, prevent future failure, and reduce reliance on reactive maintenance. This will resolve the health & safety and operational risks associated with the current condition of the roof, and enable removal of the scaffolding.
- 3.8 The STSB considers this is the most practical option, and also represents the best value over the medium and long-term.
- 3.9 Given a detailed structural inspection has been carried out, there is a degree of confidence that the current estimates represent a reasonable assessment of cost. However the final project cost will not be known until the contract has been tendered and awarded, and any subsequent value engineering carried out.

- 3.10 Approval is therefore sought to proceed to tendering, and for P&RC to have delegated authority to approve the Full Business Case.

#### **4 Funding**

- 4.1 The Ports Capital Programme identifies substantial demands for investment in infrastructure maintenance and replacement across the harbours and airport. The anticipated cost of repairing the terminal roof, under any of the scenarios, cannot reasonably be met from that routine capital programme, without having a significant impact on other essential maintenance.
- 4.2 Guernsey Airport currently operates a trading deficit, despite its fees and charges being relatively high compared to other airports. These have risen in recent years to reduce Guernsey Ports requirement for General Revenue funding. Further increases are unlikely to raise sufficient additional revenue to cover the investment required to fund the repairs to the terminal roof, and would inevitably be passed through to passengers. That would increase the cost of travel for islanders and have a detrimental impact on tourism and local businesses.
- 4.3 Guernsey Ports is already focussed on increasing non-aeronautical income, through concessions and other commercial operations at the airport, to improve financial performance. Opportunities to generate additional revenues of the scale required from these activities, either in isolation or in combination with other fees and charges, are not considered likely within the available timeframe.
- 4.4 It is therefore proposed the repairs to the terminal roof are progressed through the Major Projects Portfolio, and funded from the General Revenue Reserve.
- 4.5 The total funding envelope for the Major Projects Portfolio is £477 million. This comprises the originally approved £460 million (including £20 million of contingency funding) for projects being delivered from 2023 through to completion, together with a further £16.7 million approved for two additional projects earlier in 2026. Should the States approve that the Project be prioritised into the Delivery stage of the Portfolio, the total funding envelope will increase to £483 million.
- 4.6 The Policy & Resources Committee have advised the latest forecast, as at 30<sup>th</sup> June 2026, indicates a £1.9 million adverse variance against the approved funding envelope. However, a number of projects remain in the planning and development stages, and project costs are expected to continue evolving as designs are refined, risks are better understood and delivery strategies are confirmed.

## **5 Timescale and Implementation**

- 5.1 Subject to States approval, procurement will proceed in 2026, with the Full Business Case expected to be ready for approval in mid-2027. Depending on contractor availability, this should enable construction to commence in 2027.

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|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|
| Invitation for Expressions of Interest                                | Oct/Nov 2026        |
| States Debate                                                         | Nov/Dec 2026        |
| Tender Period                                                         | Dec 2026 – Feb 2027 |
| Full Business Case Development & Independent Project Assurance Review | Feb – May 2027      |
| P&RC - Full Business Case Approval                                    | May 2027            |
| Contract Negotiations and Lead-in Time                                | May – July 2027     |
| Commence Works on Site                                                | July 2027           |
| Work completion                                                       | Q4 2028 / Q1 2029   |

## **6 Compliance with Rule 4**

- 6.1 Rule 4 of the Rules of Procedure of the States of Deliberation and their Committees sets out the information which must be included in, or appended to, motions laid before the States.
- 6.2 In accordance with Rule 4(1):
- (a) The Propositions would progress one of the essential capital projects included within the Major Projects Portfolio approved by the States in April 2026, and enable the States' Trading Supervisory Board to fulfil its mandate in respect of maintaining Guernsey Airport's critical infrastructure, and;
  - (b) The Policy & Resources Committee supports the submission of this Policy Letter and the progression of the project subject to a Full Business Case.
  - (c) The Propositions were submitted to His Majesty's Procureur for advice on any legal or constitutional implications.
  - (d) The financial implications of the Propositions are set out in paragraphs 3.2, 4.5 and 4.6.

6.3 In accordance with Rule 4(2):

- (a) The Propositions relate to the mandate of the States' Trading Supervisory Board in respect of ensuring the efficient management, operation and maintenance of any States-owned unincorporated trading concerns.
- (b) The Propositions have the unanimous support of the States' Trading Supervisory Board.

Yours faithfully

M Helyar  
President

A Niles  
Vice-President

B Kay-Mouat  
Member

S J Thornton  
M R Thompson  
Non-States Members